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INTRODUCTION

R

esidents of Chicago’s Streeterville neighborhood
certainly cannot forget the recent financial crisis thanks
to a gaping hole in their midst.1 That hole is to be the
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Southern Illinois University School of Law, class of 2015, who provided
invaluable research assistance throughout the development of this article. The
author additionally thanks Mark Camero for his love, patience, and support as well
as his constructive criticism and astute feedback.
1
For a discussion of the global financial and credit crisis, see The Origins of the
Financial Crisis: Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 2013,
http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisisare-still-being-felt-five-years-article [hereinafter Financial Crisis: Crash Course];
Martin Neil Baily et al., The Origins of the Financial Crisis, in FIXING FINANCE
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home of the Spire, the tallest building in the Northern Hemisphere,
at 2,000 feet high with 1,194 residences ranging in price from
$750,000 for a studio to $40 million for the penthouse.2
The developer, Shelbourne Development Group, Inc., began
construction in 2007 using its own funds.3 It also obtained “starter”
funds from Bank of America via a loan agreement that required
Shelbourne to demonstrate proof of a construction loan by
November 1, 2008.4 Although Shelbourne sold thirty percent of the
building, it could not obtain construction financing due to the
worsening global financial and credit crisis.5
Bank of America
declared the loan in default and sued Shelbourne for the outstanding
principal, interest, and fees. 6 As part of its defense, Shelbourne
argued that the court should excuse it (temporarily) from providing
proof of a construction loan, due to the “unforeseeable and
unprecedented economic downturn and recession, particularly in the
real estate market.”7
Historically, parties like Shelbourne had to perform their
obligations absolutely and without excuse.8 This principle, known
as pacta sunt servanda, was a mainstay in English contract law and

SERIES PAPER 3 2008, at 10 (Initiative on Bus. and Pub. Policy at Brookings, Nov.
2008), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/11/origin%20crisis
%20baily%20litan/11_origins_crisis_baily_litan.pdf.
2
BofA Suing Spire Builder Says Shelbourne in Default on Loan, CHI. TRIB., Aug.
14, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 15844191; Robert Manor, 30% of Spire’s
Condo’s are Sold, Mark Shows It Will Be Built, Developer Says, CHI. TRIB., June 4,
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 10529156; New Details Emerge About Spire
Project, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 13, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 4787917.
3
Manor, supra note 2.
4
Complaint ¶ 6, Bank of Am., N.A. v. Shelbourne Dev. Grp., Inc., 732 F. Supp.
2d 809, 826–28 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (No. 09CV04963), 2009 WL 4695857.
5
Defendant Shelbourne Dev. Grp., Inc.’s Response to Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 7,
Bank of Am., N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d, at 826–28 [hereinafter Response]
6
Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶ 8–10.
7
Response, supra note 5, at ¶ 33.
8
Paula Walter, Commercial Impracticability in Contracts, 61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
225, 225 (1987); Aaron Wright, Comment, Rendered Impracticable: Behavioral
Economics and the Impracticability Doctrine, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183, 2187
(2005); e.g., Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
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naturally travelled over the Atlantic Ocean into American contract
law.9
Both English and American courts adhered strictly to this
principle until the early seventeenth century when they began to
excuse parties from a contract when performance became impossible
due to death.10 Over the next two centuries, courts only marginally
expanded the excuse to include any circumstance rendering
performance truly impossible.11
When the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (the “Commissioners”) recommended the adoption of the
Uniform Sales Act (the “USA”) in 1906,12 the USA only provided
for excuse due to absolute impossibility. 13 However, contractual
excuse made an about-face in Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard14 in
1916, when the court broadened the legal definition of impossibility
to include not only those actions that a party literally could not
perform, but also those actions that were impracticable for a party to

9

Walter, supra note 8, at 225; see, e.g., Phillips v. Stevens, 16 Mass. 238, 240–41
(1819); Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63, 66 (1809).
10
E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 621 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 4th
ed. 2004) (citing Williams v. Lloyd, 82 Eng. Rep. 95 (K.B. 1629)); see Beebe v.
Johnson, 19 Wend. 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); Singleton v. Carroll, 6 J.J. March.
527 (Ky. 1831).
11
E.g., The Harriman, 76 U.S. 161, 172 (1869); Beebe, 19 Wend. at 502. Both
The Harriman and Beebe noted the distinction between true impossibility and
mere impracticability. The Harriman, 76 U.S. at 172 (“If a condition be to do a
thing which is impossible, as to go from London to Rome in three hours, it is void;
but if it be to do a thing which is only improbable or absurd, or that a thing shall
happen which is beyond the reach of human power, as that it will rain to-morrow,
the contract will be upheld and enforced.”); Beebe, 19 Wend. at 502 (“[I]f the
covenant be within the range of possibility, however absurd or improbable the idea
of the execution of it may be, it will be upheld. . . . To bring the case within the
rule of dispensation, it must appear that the thing to be done cannot by any means
be accomplished; for, if it is only improbably, or out of the power of the obligor, it
is not in law deemed impossible.”).
12
William E. McCurdy, Uniformity and a Proposed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L.
REV. 572, 574 (1940).
13
Marianne M. Jennings, Commercial Impracticability – Does It Really Exist?, 2
WHITTIER L. REV. 241, 245 (1980); Michael A. Schmitt & Bruce A. Wollschlager,
Section 2-615 “Commercial Impracticability”: Making the Impracticable
Practicable, 81 COM. L.J. 9, 9 (1976).
14
Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916).
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perform due to an unreasonable and excessive cost. 15 Thus, the
excuse of commercial impracticability was born.16
Although the relatively new excuse of commercial
impracticability appeared in the Restatement (First) of Contracts in
1932, 17 courts seldom permitted excuse from a contract due to
commercial impracticability. 18 Much of this reluctance stemmed
from the theory that courts should protect the sanctity of contracts,
and avoid interfering with the agreement of the parties. 19
Additionally, courts believed a party’s ability to rely on the terms of
a contract is important to economic stability, as a party would pause
to enter into a contract if she knew the court could rescind it.20
Hoping to make commercial impracticability more available, the
Commissioners drafting Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(the “UCC”), to replace the USA, added the excuse of commercial
impracticability to the 1943 draft. 21 After the section underwent
15

Id. at 460 (“A thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not
practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive
and unreasonable cost.”) (citation omitted).
16
Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial
Impracticability: Searching for ‘The Wisdom of Solomon’, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1123, 1132–33 (1987).
17
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 457 (1932) (“[W]here, after the
formation of a contract, facts that a promisor had no reason to anticipate, and for
the occurrence of which he is not in contributory fault, render performance of the
promise impossible, the duty of the promisor is discharged.”). On first glance,
section 457 only excuses a party due to impossibility, but section 454 defines
impossibility to include impracticability. Id. § 454 (“[I]mpossibility means not
only strict impossibility but impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable
difficult, expense, injury or loss.”).
18
William D. Hawkland, The Energy Crisis and Section 2-615 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 79 COM. L.J. 75, 77 (1974); John D. Wladis, Impracticability
as Risk Allocation: The Effect of Changed Circumstances Upon Contract
Obligations for the Sale of Goods, 22 GA. L. REV. 503, 518–20 (1988); see
Schmitt & Wollschlager, supra note 13, at 11.
19
H. Ward Classen, Judicial Intervention in Contractual Relationships Under the
Uniform Commercial Code and Common Law, 42 S.C. L. REV. 379, 405 (1991);
George Wallach, The Excuse Defense in the Law of Contracts: Judicial
Frustration of the U.C.C. Attempt to Liberalize the Law of Commercial
Impracticability, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 203, 218 (1979).
20
Classen, supra note 19, at 405.
21
Stephen G. York, Re: The Impracticability Doctrine of the U.C.C., 29 DUQ. L.
REV. 221, 251–52 (1991); Hawkland, supra note 18, at 77; Wallach, supra note 19,
at 203.

4

2015

MISSION IMPRACTICABLE

5

minor changes during the drafting process, the section on
commercial impracticability has remained the same since the
promulgation of the UCC in 1950.22 Section 2-615 reads, in part:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a
greater obligation . . .
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or
in part by a seller . . . is not a breach of his duty under
a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been
made impracticable by the occurrence of a
contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made . . . .23
When the American Law Institute updated the Restatement of
Contracts in 1981, 24 it included a revision of the section on
commercial impracticability.25 Taking a cue from section 2-615(a),
section 261 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (the
“Restatement”) states:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance
is made impracticable without his fault by the
occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which
was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made, his duty to render that performance is
discharged, unless the language or the circumstances
indicate the contrary.26
22

Wladis, supra note 18, at 566.
U.C.C. § 2-615 (2013).
24
Publications Catalog: Restatement Second, Contracts, AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE,
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=29 (last
visited Oct. 11 2013, 2:15 PM) (“Restatement Second, Contracts, constitutes a
thorough revision and updating of the original 1932 Restatement. It embodies
additions inspired by the Uniform Commercial Code and improves the black-letter
formulations by altering the order or scope of topics to enhance clarity or reduce
redundancy.”).
25
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
26
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). For a thorough
discussion regarding the changes on commercial impracticability from the
Restatement (First) of Contracts to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, see
23
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Regardless of whether section 2-615 or the common law applies,
courts generally require some variation of the following elements: (1)
an event occurred making performance impracticable; (2) the nonoccurrence of that event must have been a basic assumption on
which the parties formed the contract; (3) the event was not caused
by the party seeking excuse; and (4) the risk of the event occurring
was not allocated to the party seeking excuse.27
Despite the hope that section 2-615 and section 261 would lead
to wide acceptance of commercial impracticability both under
Article 2 and the common law, courts continue to rarely excuse a
party under the doctrine of commercial impracticability. 28 Even
more rare, are judicial decisions discussing commercial
impracticability in any meaningful way. 29 The few cases that do
discuss it developed muddled and inconsistent rules, leading to an
unpredictable and confusing doctrine that fails to serve its intended
purpose.
Accordingly, this article comprehensively analyzes commercial
impracticability, revealing its many faults. It then provides a
recommendation to simplify and unify the interpretation and
application of the doctrine across contract law.
Part I presents examples of commercial impracticability that
demonstrate the current judicial interpretation and application across
jurisdictions, which almost always disfavor excuse due to
commercial impracticability.
Part II presents the various faults associated with the current
construction and application of commercial impracticability. First,
the vague and incongruent language of Article 2 and the
Restatements results in inconsistent judicial decisions and, therefore,
uncertainty surrounding the application of commercial
impracticability.
Second, the generally accepted use of
foreseeability as a key inquiry is unfounded, as neither Article 2 nor
the Restatements require an event to be unforeseeable in order to
Deborah L. Jacobs, Legal Realism or Legal Fiction? Impracticability Under the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 87 COM. L.J. 289 (1982).
27
E.g., Dell’s Maraschino Cherries Co. v. Shoreline Fruit Growers, Inc., 887 F.
Supp. 2d 459 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Bank of Am., N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
28
Wallach, supra note 19, at 213.
29
See Hawkland, supra note 18, at 79–80.
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seek excuse under commercial impracticability.
Even if
foreseeability were included in Article 2 or the Restatements, such
inclusion would be improper. The failure to allocate a foreseeable
risk does not mean the parties meant to allocate that risk to the
obligor; the parties may not have actually foreseen the foreseeable
event or were unable to agree upon risk placement due to time,
money, or disagreement. Behavioral economics concepts such as
bounded rationality, confirmation bias, and hindsight bias also
demonstrate that the emphasis on foreseeability is misguided and
unworkable.
Third, the narrow construct of commercial
impracticability flouts the intent of the drafters of both Article 2 and
the Restatements, who intended a liberal interpretation and
application.
Part III presents and critiques previous recommendations for
improvement to commercial impracticability, focusing on two of the
most common: the superior risk bearer test and judicial loss
allocation.
While these proposals arguably may improve
commercial impracticability, they fail to address the root issues
related to its construction and inconsistent application.
Part IV recommends a complete revision of commercial
impracticability, by providing suggested language and the
justifications for the revision based on law, policy, and practice.
I.

IMPRACTICABILITY IN PRACTICE

Most commercial impracticability cases correlate to some
significant national or international economic crisis, and almost
always decline to
permit excuse under commercial
30
impracticability. The first set of decisions arose from the closure
of the Suez Canal.31 Due to a conflict in the Middle East, the Suez
Canal closed from November 2, 1956, to April 9, 1957. 32 Shipping

30

See Hawkland, supra note 18 at 79–80 (noting that, as of 1974, only five
decisions relied on section 2-615).
31
Robert L. Birmingham, A Second Look at the Suez Canal Cases: Excuse for
Nonperformance of Contractual Obligations in the Light of Economic Theory, 20
HASTINGS L.J. 1393, 1400 (1969); Wallach, supra note 19, at 213.
32
Birmingham, supra note 31, at 1400. In July 1956, the Egyptian government
took control of the Suez Canal. Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d
312, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1966). A few months later, Israel invaded Egypt followed

7
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companies who entered into contracts prior to the closure
encountered financial hardship as a result of the closure; changing
their route from the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope
unexpectedly added thousands of miles and, thus, thousands of
dollars to the cost.33
Many of these shipping companies sought excuse from their
performance obligations under commercial impracticability. 34
Despite the added distance and expenditure, courts refused to excuse
these shippers from their obligations. 35 Because of the political
climate in the Middle East, parties with business interests in the area
knew the Suez Canal could be affected negatively. 36 This
foreseeability, along with the availability of alternative shipping
routes, prevented the shippers from excuse under commercial
impracticability.37
The second round of substantial judicial discussion regarding
commercial impracticability arose as a result of the oil crisis of the
1970s.38 Due to a war in the Middle East, the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) imposed an embargo on

shortly by Great Britain and France. Id. Egypt responded by closing the Suez
Canal. Id.
33
Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 83, 103
(1977). By using the Suez Canal instead of the Cape of Good Hope, which is
south of Africa, a ship may reduce its voyage anywhere from 3,315 miles to 9,887
miles. Saving in Time and Distance via the Suez Canal, SUEZ CANAL AUTH.,
http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/sc.aspx?show=11 (Jan. 22, 2014, 7:19 PM); see
Birmingham, supra note 31, at 1401.
34
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 33, at 103–04; e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp.,
363 F.2d 312; Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 275 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1960).
The closure of the Suez Canal also led to many cases in Great Britain seeking
excuse under commercial impracticability. E.g., Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v.
v/o Sovfracht, 2 Q.B. 226 (1964); Societe Franco Tunisienne d’Armement v.
Sidermar S.P.A., 2 Q.B. 278 (1960); see Birmingham, supra note 31, at 1400–02.
35
E.g., Am. Trading & Prod. Co. v. Shell Int’l Marine Ltd., 343 F. Supp. 91, 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff’d 453 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1972); Transatlantic Fin. Corp., 363
F.2d at 320; Glidden, 275 F.2d at 257.
36
Transatlantic Fin. Corp., 363 F.2d at 318–19.
37
Am. Trading, 343 F. Supp. at 95–96.
38
See, e.g., Freidco of Wilmington Del., Ltd. v. Farmers Bank of Del., 529 F.
Supp. 822, 824 (D. Del. 1981); Helms Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Nev. ex rel. Dep’t of
Highways, 634 P.2d 1224, 1225 (Nev. 1981).
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the exportation of crude oil to countries “sympathetic to Israel.”39
After OPEC lifted the embargo, it increased the price of crude oil by
400 percent over a four-month period.40 The embargo followed by
the sharp inflation led to a shortage of oil, and exorbitant prices for
what oil was available.41 Like the Suez Canal cases, courts found
the oil crisis foreseeable due to the constant interference with the
trade of oil, and refused to excuse parties affected by the shortage
and high prices from their contractual obligations.42
The most recent set of decisions involving commercial
impracticability stemmed from the recent global financial and credit
crisis.43ahr Like the developer of the Chicago Spire, individuals and
organizations sought excuse from their contractual obligations due to
commercial impracticability, arguing that the global financial and
credit crisis prevented payment as required under their contracts.44
Courts resoundingly rejected the defense because fluctuations in
market conditions or the financial viability of a party are events
expressly excluded by both sections 2-615 and 261.45

39

E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 433–34 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
Id. at 434.
41
Richard W. Duesenberg, Contract Impracticability: Courts Begin to Shape § 2615, 32 BUS. LAW. 1089, 1093 (1977).
42
E.g., Helms Constr. & Dev. Co., 634 P.2d at 1225; E. Air Lines, Inc., 415 F.
Supp. at 440–42.
43
E.g., Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. P’ship v. Essar Steel Minn., LLC, 871
F. Supp. 2d 843, 856–58 (D. Minn. 2012); Howard Johnson Int’l, Inc. v. M.D.1,
LLC, No. 11 C 2593, 2012 WL 5199634, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2012); Bank of
Am., N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d at 826–28; Twin Holdings of Del. LLC v. CW Capital,
LLC, No. 005193/09, 26 Misc. 3d 1214(A), *5–6 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 19, 2010).
For a discussion of the global financial and credit crisis, see Financial Crisis:
Crash Course, supra note 1; Baily et al., supra note 1.
44
Supra note 25
45
E.g., Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. P’ship, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 858;
Howard Johnson Int’l, Inc., 2012 WL 5199634 at *3; Bank of Am., N.A. v.
Shelbourne Dev. Group, Inc., No. 09C4963, 2011 WL 829390, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 3, 2011); Twin Holdings of Del. LLC, 26 Misc. 3d at *5–6. Both section 2615 and section 261 contain comments that expressly prohibit a commercial
impracticability defense for market conditions. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4 (2013)
(“Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is
exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are
intended to cover.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. b (1981)
(“The continuation of existing market conditions and of the financial situations of
40

9
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IMPRACTICABLE COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY

Commercial impracticability arose out of the necessity for
excuse from contractual obligations, in order to achieve the
underlying purpose of the contract and to achieve fairness. Despite
these noble objectives, commercial impracticability developed into a
narrowly applied, unpredictable doctrine based on vague and
inconsistent language. The requirement that the supervening event
was unforeseeable is unfounded statutorily, theoretically, and
practically. Neither Article 2 nor the Restatement refers to
foreseeability, and neither precludes excuse under commercial
impracticability due to the foreseeability of the supervening event.
Nevertheless, the inquiry into foreseeability is fraught with incorrect
assumptions about how parties allocate risks, failing to account for
the circumstances surrounding the contract formation and the effect
of human psychology on risk assessment and allocation.
A.

Linguistic Impracticability

The drafters of both Article 2 and the Restatement purposely
omitted a definition of “impracticable,” leaving the task to the
courts.46 Unfortunately, judges have defined “impracticable” with
equally vague terms such as “commercial senselessness” 47 and
“excessive and unreasonable cost,” 48 creating inconsistency and
uncertainty as to what constitutes impracticability. 49 Although
the parties are ordinarily not such assumptions, so that mere market shifts or
financial ability do not usually effect discharge.”).
46
U.C.C.§ 2-615 cmt. 2 (2013) (“The present section deliberately refrains from
any effort at an exhaustive expression of contingencies.”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. a (1981) (“But, like Uniform Commercial
Code § 2-615(a), this Section states a principle broadly applicable to all types of
impracticability.”); Daniel T. Ostas & Frank P. Darr, Understanding Commercial
Impracticability: Tempering Efficiency with Community Fairness Norms, 27
RUTGERS L.J. 343, 348 (1996); Steven Walt, Expectations, Loss Distribution and
Commercial Impracticability, 24 IND. L. REV. 65, 65–66 (1990).
47
See, e.g., Natus Corp. v. United States, 371 F.2d 450, 457 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
48
Classen, supra note 19, at 385; e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 826 F.2d 239, 277 (4th Cir. 1987); Asphalt Int’l, Inc. v. Enter.
Shipping Corp., S.A., 667 F.2d 261, 266 (2d Cir. 1981); Natus Corp., 371 F.2d at
456; Mineral Park Land Co., 156 P. at 460.
49
Henry Chajet, Comment, Contractual Excuse Based on a Failure of
Presupposed Conditions, 14 DUQ. L. REV. 235, 251 (1976); Jennings, supra note
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courts indicate that unprofitability or financial burden is insufficient
for excuse, 50 no quantitative standards exist to understand when
unprofitability becomes impracticability. 51 Anything less than 100
percent cost increase appears almost conclusively insufficient,52 but,
beyond that, courts vary wildly as to what is sufficient.53
Additionally, the UCC version of commercial impracticability,
section 2-615, only references the seller, 54 thus, technically
rendering commercial impracticability unavailable to buyers. 55
However, Comment 9 suggests that commercial impracticability
may be available to buyers as well.56 The Commissioners purposely
13, at 254; see Richard E. Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance in Sales Contracts:
Some Thoughts About Risk Management, 32 S.C. L. REV. 241, 267 (1980);
Richard S. Wirtz, Revolting Developments, 91 OR. L. REV. 325, 348 (2012).
50
E.g., Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283, 293 (7th
Cir. 1974); Schafer v. Sunset Packing Co., 474 P.2d 529, 530 (Ore. 1970).
51
Gerald T. McLaughlin, Unconscionability and Impracticability: Reflections on
Two U.C.C. Indeterminacy Principles, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 439, 450
(1992); Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 33, at 86; Alan O. Sykes, The Doctrine of
Commercial Impracticability in a Second-Best World, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 75
(1990); Speidel, supra note 49, at 267. Professor Dick Speidel argues that a
quantitative inquiry for commercial impracticability is improper. Id. He suggests
that courts instead should examine the extent to which performance differs from
the agreed performance as well as the amount of undeserved gain, if any, the buyer
receives without excuse. Id. at 266–68.
52
Am. Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int’l Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir.
1972) (one-third cost increase insufficient); Transatlantic Fin. Corp., 363 F.2d at
319 ($43,972 cost increase on contract of $304,843 insufficient); see, e.g.,
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 73–76 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(finding $60 million loss sufficient); Iowa Elec. Light and Power v. Atlas Corp.,
467 F. Supp. 129, 140 (N.D. Iowa 1978) rev'd, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979)
(finding 52% cost increase insufficient); Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Union Carbide
Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 989, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
53
Wallach, supra note 19, at 217; Walt, supra note 46, at 67; see, e.g., Publicker
Indus. Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. At 992 ($5.8 million loss over life of contract
sufficient); Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 43 N.W.2d 657, 667 (Neb.
1950) (double costs insufficient).
54
U.C.C. § 2-615 (2013) (“Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater
obligation…”).
55
Thomas Black, Sales Contracts and Impracticability in a Changing World, 13
ST. MARY’S L.J. 247, 257 (1981); see Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 33, at 109.
56
U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 9 (2013); Black, supra note 55, at 257; Richard W.
Duesenberg, Exiting from Bad Bargains via U.C.C. Section 2-615: An
Impracticable Dream, 1 UCC L.J. 32, 34–35 (1980) [hereinafter Exiting from Bad
Bargains]; Duesenberg, supra note 41, at 1091.
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drafted section 2-615 in this manner given the uncertainty of the
common law at that time regarding a buyer’s ability to invoke
commercial impracticability.57
Regardless of the rationale, this linguistic conflict has led to a
split among courts as to whether a buyer may claim commercial
impracticability as an excuse to performance. 58 Some courts only
look to the language of section 2-615 to prevent a buyer’s excuse
under commercial impracticability,59 while others read the section in
conjunction with the Official Comments to allow a buyer to seek
excuse under commercial impracticability.60
The Mississippi legislature recognized this inconsistency and
revised section 2-615 to expressly include buyers. 61 Interestingly,
the Permanent Editorial Board (the “PEB”) for the UCC criticized
this revision.62 Without providing examples or even hypotheticals,
the PEB quickly dismissed the addition, stating that including buyers
in section 2-615 could result in “excuse in inappropriate cases.” 63
This concern is unfounded as it merely gives a buyer the opportunity
to seek excuse under commercial impracticability; the buyer still
must meet the requirements of section 2-615.64
57

Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 33, at 109.
See, e.g., Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879, 884 (10th
Cir. 1985).
59
E.g., Ky. Util. Co. v. S. E. Coal Co., 836 S.W.2d 392, 397 (Ky. 1992); see N.
Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cnty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 277 (7th Cir. 1986).
60
E.g., Nora Springs Coop. Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 1976); N.
Ill. Gas Co. v. Energy Coop., Inc., 122 Ill. App. 3d 940, 954 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
61
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-615(d) (West 2014). Mississippi currently is the only
state to revise section 2-615 to include buyers. U.C.C. LOCAL CODE VARIATIONS §
2-615 (West 2013).
62
Arthur Nakazato, Comment, Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-615:
Commercial Impracticability from the Buyer’s Perspective, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 518,
547 (1978). The PEB oversees the drafting of the UCC and recommends revisions.
Permanent Editorial Board for Uniform Commercial Code, UNIFORM LAW
COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=Permanent%20Editorial%20B
oard%20for%20Uniform%20Commercial%20Code (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
63
Brian S. Conneely & Edmond P. Murphy, Comment, Inevitable Discovery: The
Hypothetical Independent Source Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 137, 183–84 (1976); Nakazato, supra note 62, at 547.
64
Conneely & Murphy, supra note 63, at 184; Nakazato, supra note 62, at 547–48
(discussing why section 2-615 should expressly include buyers).
58
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The failure to define “impracticable,” and the conflict over
whether a buyer is allowed excuse due to commercial
impracticability, results in an inconsistent application of commercial
impracticability. Inconsistent application creates unpredictability,
which often leads parties to spend additional time and money during
the contracting phase to eliminate the unpredictability.65 Moreover,
vague and incongruent provisions are in opposition to the stated
objective of the UCC, which is “to simplify, clarify, and modernize
the law governing commercial transactions.”66
B.

Unforeseen Impracticability

A key judicial inquiry in the evaluation of commercial
impracticability is whether the event was foreseeable at the time of
contracting.67 The focus on foreseeability stems from the theory that
a party would, or should, protect itself from a foreseeable event by
adjusting the contract price or obtaining insurance to cover the risk
of the event’s occurrence.68
This fixation with foreseeability as the crux of commercial
impracticability is unwarranted and inappropriate.
First, the
foreseeability test is not derived from the language of section 2-615
or Restatement section 261.69 Neither section expressly or implicitly
requires, or even suggests, that the event be unforeseeable in order
for a party to seek excuse under commercial impracticability. 70

65

Sykes, supra note 51, at 72–73.
U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2013).
67
Rockland Indus., Inc. v. E+E (US) Inc., Manley-Regan Chems. Div., 991 F.
Supp. 468, 472 (D. Md. 1998), reconsidered in part, 1 F. Supp. 2d 528 (D. Md.
1998).
68
Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Grp. Eng’rs., Inc., Clark Dietz Div., 775 F.2d 781, 786
(7th Cir. 1985); Exelon Generation Co., LLC v. Gen. Atomics Techs. Corp., 559 F.
Supp. 2d 892, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2008); John Elofson, The Dilemma of Changed
Circumstances in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis of the Foreseeability and
Superior Risk Bearer Tests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 4 (1996).
69
York, supra note 21, at 229.
70
Comment, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile Economy: Saving U.C.C. Section
2-615 from the Common Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 1032, 1038 (1978) [hereinafter
Contractual Flexibility]; Thomas R. Hurst, Freedom of Contract in an Unstable
Economy: Judicial Reallocation of Contractual Risks Under U.C.C. Section 2-615,
54 N.C. L. REV. 545, 569 (1976); York, supra note 21, at 229.
66
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Indeed, the Comments to section 261 expressly reject foreseeability
as a conclusive element of commercial impracticability.71
Courts applying section 2-615 often point to Comment 1 of
section 2-615 to justify the use of foreseeability, 72 which states:
“This section excuses a seller…where his performance had become
commercially impracticable because of unforeseen supervening
circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the time
of contracting.” 73 However, a distinct difference exists between
“unforeseen,” which is utilized in Comment 1 to section 2-615, and
“unforeseeable,” which is utilized by courts.74
Unforeseen means that the parties did not actually anticipate the
event, while unforeseeable means the event was not capable of being
anticipated.75 Comment 1 hints at this distinction by its language
“not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contact.”76
Using foreseeable and not foreseen significantly matters. Rather
than inquire into whether the parties actually anticipated the event,
courts incorrectly look to whether the parties should have anticipated
the event. 77 Given the continuous economic fluctuations, political
disruptions, and natural disasters of today’s world, most every event
is foreseeable, but not necessarily foreseen, virtually eliminating the
application of commercial impracticability.78
The second flaw of the foreseeability test stems from the
underlying rationale that contracts generally allocate foreseeable

71

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. b (“The fact that the event
was foreseeable, or even foreseen, does not necessarily compel a conclusion that
its occurrence was not a basic assumption.”).
72
See, e.g., Heat Exchangers, Inc. v. Map Constr. Corp., 34 Md. App. 679, 682
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
73
U.C.C. § 2-615, cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
74
Contractual Flexibility, supra note 70, at 1039; York, supra note 21, at 229–30.
75
Classen, supra note 19, at 407–08; OXFORD DICTIONARY, “Unforeseen” vs.
“Unforeseeable”, www.oxforddictionaries.com (last visited April 2, 2014)
(defining unforeseen as “not anticipated or predicted” while unforeseeable defined
as “not able to be anticipated or predicted.”).
76
U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 1; Contractual Flexibility, supra note 70, at 1039.
77
See, e.g., Bende & Sons, Inc. v. Crown Recreation, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 1018,
1022 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) aff’d, 722 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1983); Fla. Power & Light Co.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440, 454 (E.D. Va. 1981).
78
Classen, supra note 19, at 408; Leon E. Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss
Sharing and Commercial Impracticability, 69 MINN. L. REV. 471, 479 (1985).
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risks of performance to the obligor; 79 thus, if an event were
foreseeable, the parties would have allocated the risk to the obligor.80
Failure to allocate a foreseeable risk does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the parties would have allocated that risk to the
obligor.81 The lack of risk allocation could be due to numerous facts,
including that the parties did not foresee the foreseeable risk or the
parties’ inability to reach an agreement due to time, cost or
bargaining power.82
Behavioral economics also may explain why parties have not
allocated a foreseeable risk. A relatively young field of study,
behavioral economics evaluates the effect of human psychology on
economic theory “to improve the predictive power of…economics
by building in more realistic accounts of actors’ behavior” 83 than
neoclassical economics.84
A fundamental theory within behavioral economics is bounded
rationality.85 Developed by Nobel Prize winning psychologist and
economist Herbert Simon, bounded rationality provides that
individuals possess limited cognitive resources to process relevant
79

E.g., Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1944) (“The purpose of a contract
is to place the risk of performance upon the promisor.”).
80
Waldinger Corp., 775 F.2d at 786; Classen, supra note 19, at 409; Duesenberg,
supra note 40, at 43; Elofson, supra note 68, at 4; York, supra note 21, at 231.
81
Transatlantic Fin. Corp., 363 F.2d at 318 (“Foreseeability or even recognition
of a risk does not necessarily prove its allocation.”); see Hurst, supra note 70, at
567.
82
Contractual Flexibility, supra note 70, at 1040; Elofson, supra note 68, at 5;
Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply
Contracts, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 369, 373 (1981) [hereinafter Court-Imposed Price
Adjustments]; Walt, supra note 46; York, supra note 21, at 231; see Speidel, supra
note 49, at 242. The drafters of the Restatements even acknowledge that
“foreseeable” and “foreseen” do not lead to the conclusion that the parties meant
for the risk of the event’s occurrence to remain with the promisor. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. c (1981) (“Factors such as the practical
difficulty of reaching agreement on the myriad of conceivable terms of a complex
agreement may excuse a failure to deal with improbably contingencies.”).
83
Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND
ITS APPLICATIONS 115, 116 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007).
84
Christine Jolls, et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economcis, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471, 1475 (1998); Wright, supra note 8, at 2200–01, 2209. For an
explanation of the fundamentals of behavioral economics as well as some legal
applications, see Jolls, supra note 83; Jolls et al., supra note 84.
85
Wright, supra note 8, at 2200-01.
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information and make decisions.86 These cognitive limitations result
in various behavioral biases during the decision-making process,
including confirmation bias, over-optimism, and hindsight bias. 87
These biases likely contribute to the failure to allocate a foreseeable
risk by limiting parties’ ability to accurately assess the probability of
a foreseeable risk occurring.88
Confirmation bias provides that an individual only seeks
information that supports a favored result.89 People unwittingly seek
evidence to support their position, or avoid evidence that counters
their position.90 They avoid information and activities that do not
support their choice.91 In the context of risk allocation, confirmation
bias often prevents an individual from changing their initial risk
assessment.92 Despite new evidence that informs a risk assessment,
confirmation bias suggests individuals ignore that evidence, and,
therefore, fail to protect themselves in the event the risk occurs.93
Over-optimism likewise hinders individuals’ risk assessment.ahr
Even when a risk is foreseeable, individuals often are quixotically
optimistic about the probability of a negative event affecting them.94
Although they know the potential risks associated with the contract,
individuals believe that the worst-case scenario will not happen to
them, and thus fail to protect themselves within the contract or
through other risk management techniques.95
86

Jolls et al., supra note 84, at 1477; Symposium, Listening to Cassandra: The
Difficulty of Recognizing Risks and Taking Action, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2329,
2347–48 (2010); Wright, supra note 8, at 2201.
87
Symposium, supra note 86, at 2348; Wright, supra note 8, at 2201, 2203.
88
Wright, supra note 8, at 2206–07.
89
Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. OF GEN. PSYCH. 175, 175 (1998) (“When men wish to construct or
support a theory, how they torture facts into their service!”) (citation omitted).
90
Id.; Wright, supra note 8, at 2204.
91
Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts,
68 LA. L. REV. 117, 132 (2007).
92
Wright, supra note 8, at 2204–05.
93
Id. at 2205, 2208.
ahr
Becher, supra note 91, at 147; Wright, supra note 8, at 2203–04. For a
discussion on studies demonstrating this over-optimism, see Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV.
211, 216–17 (1995).
94
Id.
95
Wright, supra note 8, at 2208–09.
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The third issue with the foreseeability test also stems from
behavioral economics. Hindsight bias indicates that events seem
more foreseeable ex post than ex ante.96 When individuals recall the
past, their memory is inadvertently clouded with events and
knowledge that occurred subsequent to that past. 97 Because
hindsight bias limits an individual’s ability to accurately recall what
she knew at a particular moment, an inquiry into what was
foreseeable at that moment may not produce accurate results.98
In experiments conducted by noted psychologist Baruch
Fischhoff, subjects consistently recalled giving higher probabilities
to events that occurred than they did initially.99 Even more telling is
that these subjects were unaware of this hindsight bias.100
In the context of commercial impracticability, judges generally
consider the event foreseeable first, and then seek evidence to prove
otherwise. 101 Because of hindsight bias, it is difficult to provide
evidence that the event was not foreseeable. 102 Consequently,
hindsight bias hinders the application of commercial impracticability,
by making every event seem foreseeable.103

Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM.
PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE, No. 3, 1975 at 288–99; Baruch Fischhoff et al.,
Evolving Judgments of Terror Risk: Foresight, Hindsight, and Emotion, 11 J. OF
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 124, 125 (2005) [hereinafter Evolving Judgments];
Wright, supra note 8, at 2205, 2211.
97
Evolving Judgments, supra note 96 at 125.
98
Hurst, supra note 70, at 568; Wallach, supra note 19, at 215; Walter, supra note
8, at 239; see Evolving Judgments, supra note 93, at 127; Wright, supra note 8, at
2211.
99
Evolving Judgments, supra note 96, at 288, 292, 297. In one experiment,
Professor Fischhoff randomly assigned subjects to one of two groups. Id. at 289.
The first group received a brief description of a historical event and a list of four
possible outcomes. Id. The second group received the same description and list
but also told which outcome came to fruition. Id. The second group consistently
assigned a higher probability of occurrence to the outcome they knew occurred. Id.
at 289–93.
100
Id. at 297.
101
See Evolving Judgments, supra note 96, at 298.
102
Id. Wright, supra note 8, at 2211.
103
Howard O. Hunter, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 19:24 (updated Mar.
2013); Hurst, supra note 70, at 568.
96
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The emphasis on foreseeability is arguably the biggest defect
with commercial impracticability. Regardless of its lack of a
linguistic basis, foreseeability simply is not indicative of how parties
allocate the risk of a supervening event.104 Even if it were indicative,
hindsight bias limits the ability to accurately determine the
foreseeability of an event once the parties and the court know the
outcome.105
C.

Unintentional Impracticability
Professor Karl Llewellyn, the lead drafter of UCC Article 2,
intended Article 2 as a practical approach to commercial law. 106 In
the context of section 2-615, he utilized the term “commercial
impracticability” rather than the traditional term of “impossibility” in
order to broaden the application of excuse due to commercial
impracticability.107
This intent to broaden the availability of commercial
impracticability is evident both in the language of section 2-615 and
its Official Comments. 108 For example, Comment 3 specifically
104

Wright, supra note 8, at 2207–08.
Id. at 2205–06.
106
Hawkland, supra note 18, at 77; York, supra note 21, at 235–36, 252; see
Jennings, supra note 13, at 246. Professor Llewellyn, who is often dubbed the
“Father of the UCC,” greatly influenced the development of commercial law in the
mid-twentieth century. To learn more about Professor Llewellyn and his impact,
see Charles E. Clark, Karl Llewellyn, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 614 (1962); Arthur L.
Corbin, A Tribute to Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 805 (1962); Henry Murray et al.,
The Poetic Imagination of Karl Llewellyn, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 27 (1997); William
Twining, The Idea of Juristic Method: A Tribute to Karl Llewellyn, 48 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 119 (1993). To read a few of Professor Llewellyn’s noted works, see KARL
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON LAW AND ITS STUDY (Oxford U. Press
2008); KARL LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(Transaction Publishers 2008); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES
(Frederick Schauer, ed., U. of Chi. Press 2011); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE
LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA (Paul Gewirtz, ed., Michael Ansaldi, trans., U of Chi.
Press 1989).
107
Nakazato, supra note 62, at 533; see Jennings, supra note 13, at 246; Conneely
& Murphy, supra note 63, at 171.
108
Nora Springs Coop. Co., 247 N.W.2d at 748; Black, supra note 55, at 249;
Duesenberg, supra note 40, at 1101. Professor Llewellyn intended each UCC
section to express its purpose within its language in order to promote uniform
judicial application. York, supra note 21, at 239.
105
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contrasts commercial impracticability from impossibility and
frustration of performance, while Comment 6 permits judges to “use
equitable principles in furtherance of commercial standards and good
faith.” 109 These excerpts suggest that the Commissioners viewed
commercial impracticability more broadly than the common law.110
Professor Llewellyn’s private notes confirm the intent to
liberalize commercial impracticability. 111 Discussing a proposed
revision to the USA, which was inserted verbatim into a draft of
Article 2, Professor Llewellyn notes the goal of the commercial
impracticability provision was to broaden the current availability of
commercial impracticability. 112 Professor Llewellyn believed the
widespread use of force majeure clauses in contracts demonstrated
that most parties presume excuse when performance becomes
commercially impracticable due to certain supervening
circumstances.113
The drafters of section 261 likewise anticipated a broader
application of commercial impracticability under the Restatements.
Not only is section 261 based largely on section 2-615, comment a
expressly relays the intent to liberalize the application: “[L]ike
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615(a), this Section states a principle
broadly applicable to all types of impracticability.”114
Despite evidence to broaden commercial impracticability in both
Article 2 and the Restatements, the current judicial interpretation and
application of commercial impracticability contravenes the intent of
the Commissioners. 115 Courts continue to apply commercial
109

U.C.C. § 2-615 cmts. 3, 6. Nora Springs Coop. Co., 247 N.W.2d at 748
(“Comment 3…clearly indicates that this less stringent test was consciously
adopted to reflect the commercial character of modern business practice.”); Black,
supra note 55, at 249–50;; York, supra note 21, at 236–39. Courts generally treat
the Official Comments akin to legislative history, looking to them for explanation
of the history and policy of the UCC. Wladis, supra note 18, at 567; York, supra
note 21, at 237 (citing Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 597, 599 (1966)).
110
York, supra note 21, at 238; see Nora Springs Coop. Co., 247 N.W.2d at 748.
111
Jennings, supra note 13, at 246.
112
Id.; Hawkland, supra note 18, at 77.
113
2 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & LINDA J. RUSCH, HAWKLAND UCC SERIES 2615:1 (Frederick H. Miller, ed., updated Sept. 2014).
114
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. a.
115
Black, supra note 55, at 249–50; Jennings, supra note 13, at 246; Wallach,
supra note 19, at 218.
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impracticability narrowly, 116 and the few courts that attempt to
broaden in accordance with the intent of sections 2-615 and 261 are
criticized heavily.117
III.

IMPRACTICABLE SOLUTIONS

A number of scholars have suggested alternatives to commercial
impracticability, ranging from minor revisions to a complete
overhaul. 118 Although many of these recommendations arguably
improve the current scheme, most only address specific concerns
rather than improve the doctrine comprehensively or create new
concerns. 119
Two of the most referenced and analyzed
recommendations are the superior risk bearer test and judicial loss
allocation.120
A.

Superior Risk Bearer Test121

A primary function of a contract is to allocate the inherent risks
of the transaction among the parties. 122 When the parties fail to
allocate a particular risk, contract law provide default terms that do

116

E.g., Barbarossa & Sons v. Iten Chevrolet, Inc., 265 N.W. 2d 655 (Minn. 1978);
Neal-Cooper Grain Co., 508 F.2d.
117
E.g., John P. Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: The United
States, 64 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1 (1984).
118
E.g., Christopher J. Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine,
11 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 (1982); Hurst, supra note 70, at 575–83; Posner &
Rosenfield, supra note 32; Walt, supra note 46, at 76–102; Wirtz, supra note 48,
at 355–56; York, supra note 21, at 248–52.
119
See, e.g., Hurst, supra note 70, at 575–83 (revision creates rebuttable
assumption of placing risk on seller and adds “impossibility”); Walt, supra note 46,
at 76–102 (revision based on loss distribution principles); Wirtz, supra note 48, at
355–56 (revision removes foreseeability and basic assumption); York, supra note
21, at 248–52 (revision focuses on comporting with intent of drafters).
120
See, e.g., Bruce, supra note 118; Elofson, supra note 68; Posner & Rosenfield,
supra note 32; Trakman, supra note 78, at 485–86.
121
This section presents an overview of the superior risk bearer test and its
critiques. To read a more in-depth presentation of the superior risk bearer test, see
Bruce, supra note 118, and Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 32. For a detailed
critique of the superior risk bearer test, see Elofson, supra note 68; Halpern, supra
note 16, at 1159–61; Pietro Trimarchi, Commercial Impracticability in Contract
Law: An Economic Analysis, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 63 (1991).
122
Classen, supra note 19, at 409; Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 32, at 88.
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so for them.123 According to Professor Richard Posner and Andrew
Rosenfield, these default terms should achieve economic efficiency
(i.e. maximize the value of the transaction and reduce transaction
costs) by providing the terms the parties likely would have
negotiated.124
In the context of commercial impracticability, Posner and
Rosenfield argue that economic efficiency occurs when the risk of an
event is allocated to the party with the lowest cost of appraising and
either preventing or minimizing risks associated with a supervening
event.125 In other words, the risk of a supervening event should fall
upon the superior risk bearer.126
To determine which party is the superior risk bearer, courts
would examine who had (1) knowledge of the risk, (2) knowledge of
the possible magnitude of the risk, (3) knowledge of the probability
of the risk materializing, and (4) the ability and cost to minimize the
risk or its loss through self-insurance, an insurance policy, or other
diversification.127 Generally, the obligor is the superior risk bearer
under these elements, because it usually is in the better position to
understand the risks of performing under the contract, and, therefore,
in the better position to prevent or minimize the risk.128 The obligee
becomes the superior risk bearer only when the obligee could have
insured against the risk at a lower cost.129
Economics professor Christopher Bruce agrees with Posner and
Rosenfield’s superior risk bearer test but offers a number of
improvements.130 First, the evaluation of which party is the superior
risk bearer should include an assessment of damage mitigation.131 In
particular, the availability of discharge under commercial
impracticability should depend upon each party’s attempt to mitigate
damages and the results of those attempts. 132 Second, Professor
123

Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 32, at 88–89.
Id. at 88–89, 98.
125
Id. at 90; see Elofson, supra note 68, at 8; Halpern; supra note 16, at 1158–59;
Speidel, supra note 49, at 248.
126
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 32, at 90.
127
Id. at 91–92, 117.
128
Id. at 91-92.
129
Id
130
Bruce, supra note 118, at 311–12.
131
Id. at 315-17, 321–23.
132
Id. at 316, 321–23.
124
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Bruce suggests a decreased emphasis on the ability of the more
knowledgeable party to obtain insurance at a lower cost, because the
more knowledgeable party often will circumvent this rule due to an
increased bargaining position and shift the burden to the lessinformed party.133
Even with Professor Bruce’s refinements, the superior risk bearer
test is inadequate to remedy the defects of commercial
impracticability. The fundamental assumption that parties allocate
risks efficiently is incorrect. 134 First, parties generally do not
allocate risk to the party with the best information. 135 Indeed, as
Professor Bruce himself points out, the parties with better
information possess greater bargaining power, which enables them
to negotiate the risk away to the other party. 136 This asymmetric
information instead leads to inefficiencies due to increased
negotiation costs and the obligor’s failure to insure. 137 Second,
parties may not allocate risks efficiently due to industry customs,
confirmation bias, over-optimism, or willingness to accept a loss in
the short term with the hope it will achieve a large profit in future
contracts.138
Moreover, the superior risk bearer test fails to examine whether
the party who could have insured against the loss through selfinsurance, an insurance policy, or other diversification actually did
so.139 That party may have assumed (incorrectly) that the other party
was the cheaper insurer 140 or had knowledge that the other party
actually obtained insurance despite not being the more efficient
insurer. Furthermore, insurance, while not impossible to obtain, is
often unworkable due to the difficulty to calculate statistically these
uncommon, supervening events without sufficient actuarial data.141
Irrespective of these fundamental defects, the application of the
superior risk bearer test is unworkable. Information and insurance
133

Id. at 318–20.
Halpern, supra note 16, at 1158, 1165.
135
Elofson, supra note 68, at 10–11.
136
Id. at 10.
137
Bruce, supra note 118, at 318, 320; Sykes, supra note 50, at 68.
138
Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 617, 626 (1983); see supra notes 81–91 and accompanying text.
139
Elofson, supra note 68, at 7.
140
Id. at 24–25.
141
Trimarchi, supra note 118, at 66–67.
134
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costs are often similar for both parties, making the determination of
the cheaper insurer irresolvable, a defect which Posner and
Rosenfield acknowledge.142 Other relevant factors such as the party
best able to estimate the probability of the supervening event and the
best party able to estimate the event’s resulting loss often result in
conflicting conclusions as to which party is the superior risk
bearer.143
Moreover, ascertaining which party was able to minimize the
risk or insure against it creates an administrative nightmare. 144
Given the nature of the information necessary to determine the
superior risk bearer, determining and collecting the relevant
information is difficult, time-consuming, and subject to hindsight
bias.145
Furthermore, the superior risk bearer test suffers from hindsight
bias much the same way as the current construct of commercial
impracticability, because the court is examining who could have
insured or minimized the risk more efficiently in hindsight and with
greater information than the parties had at the moment of contract
formation.146
B.

Loss Allocation

If a court holds that performance is commercially impracticable,
then the remedy is to excuse the obligor from the performance
required under the contract.147 Otherwise, the obligor must perform
142

Bruce, supra note 118, at 321; Elofson, supra note 68, at 13–27; Ostas & Darr,
supra note 46, at 352–53; Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 32, at 110; Speidel,
supra note 49, at 252–53;
143
George G. Triantis, Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of
the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability, U. TORONTO L.J. 450, 455, 476
(1992).
144
Halpern, supra note 16, at 1159–60; see Bruce, supra note 118, at 321 (noting
that often “the court will be unable to determine which of the parties is the
superior risk bearer, either because the parties' insurance costs are very similar or
because the court lacks sufficient information.”); Sykes, supra note 51, at 50.
145
Bruce, supra note 118, at 321; Halpern, supra note 16, at 1159–61; Sykes,
supra note 51, at 93.
146
See Halpern, supra note 16, at 1160–61; supra notes 92–JAM01 and
accompanying text.
147
Steven W. Hubbard, Comment, Relief from Burdensome Long-Term Contracts:
Commercial Impracticability, Frustration of Purpose, Mutual Mistake of Fact,
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and absorb the entire resulting loss. 148 The consequence of this
framework is that commercial impracticability is an all-or-nothing
doctrine; either the obligor is fully liable or it is fully free of its
obligations. 149
Under the current construct of commercial
impracticability, the obligor almost always absorbs the entire loss.150
To alleviate this harsh effect of commercial impracticability,
some scholars recommend that, rather than place the entire burden
on just one party, both parties share the loss. 151 In addition to
creating a fairer result for all parties, this remedial scheme helps to
preserve any long-term contractual relationship. 152 Moreover, the
possibility of judicial loss allocation may incentivize parties to settle
out of court in order to achieve greater control over the allocation.153
One approach to loss allocation is for the parties to split the loss
equally.154 Professor Jeffrey Harrison supports this approach, citing
both legal and moral foundation based on the view of a contract as a
moral partnership. 155 Because the parties in both contracts and
partnerships create the relationship for their mutual benefit,
Professor Harrison considers contracts as “quasi-partnership.” 156
Accordingly, just as partners share losses equally absent agreement,
the parties to a contract likewise should share losses equally absent
agreement. 157 Moreover, Professor Harrison argues that an equal
split results in the fair and moral result as neither party agreed to
bear the entire loss of an unexpected event.158

and Equitable Adjustment, 47 MO. L. REV. 79, 80 (1982); see Trakman, supra note
78, at 485.
148
See Trakman, supra note 78, at 485.
149
Id.; Hubbard, supra note 147, at 80; Robert W. Reeder III, Comment, CourtImposed Modifications: Supplementing the All-or-Nothing Approach to Discharge
Cases, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1079, 1080 (1983).
150
Reeder, supra note 149, at 1080.
151
E.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Case for Loss Sharing, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 573
(1983); Reeder, supra note 149, at 1095; Trakman, supra note 78, at 484, 486.
152
McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 779 (W. Va. 1984) (Harshbarger, J.,
concurring).
153
Reeder, supra note 149, at 1090.
154
Harrison, supra note 151, at 592–601.
155
Id. at 575, 592–601.
156
Id. at 592–95.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 601.
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Because an equal split may result in just as unfair a division of
loss as the current remedial scheme, many scholars instead suggest a
proportionate, judicial loss allocation. 159 To assist the judge in
determining the allocation, the parties would present evidence such
as the nature of the risk, the ability to mitigate the risk, the ability to
withstand the loss, and the effect of the allocation on consumer
interests.160
Only one case utilized proportionate loss allocation upon a
finding of commercial impracticability: Aluminum Co. of America vs.
Essex Group, Inc.161 In ALCOA, the parties entered into a Molten
Metal Agreement in which ALCOA would convert aluminum
supplied by Essex into molten aluminum which Essex would then
process into aluminum wire.162 The long-term agreement contained
a price escalation clause based, in part, on the Wholesale Price Index
– Industrial Commodities (“WPI”).163 Historically, the WPI closely
mirrored ALCOA’s non-labor costs. 164 However, due to an oil
embargo and pollution control measures, ALCOA’s electricity costs
skyrocketed and substantially deviated from the WPI.165
ALCOA filed suit asking the court to modify the agreement due
to commercial impracticability. 166 Judge Teitlebaum held that
ALCOA’s performance was commercially impracticable given that
ALCOA would lose $60 million over the life of the contract and,
although an unnecessary requirement, that the substantial deviation
from the WPI was unforeseeable. 167 Rather than excuse ALCOA
from performance, Judge Teitlebaum chose to reform the agreement
in order to “better preserve the purposes and expectations of the
parties” and “avoid injustice in this case.”168
The parties agreed that, should the court find commercial
impracticability applicable, the appropriate loss allocation was to
159

Trakman, supra note 78, at 484, 503–04.
Id. at 484, 490, 503–04.
161
499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Hubbard, supra note 147, at 103–04.
162
Aluminum Co. of Am., 499 F. Supp. at 55–56.
163
Id. at 56.
164
Id. at 58.
165
Id. at 58–59.
166
Id. at 70.
167
Id. at 73, 76.
168
Aluminum Co. of Am., 499 F. Supp. at 79.
160
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reform the contract to the ceiling price set forth in the agreement.169
Nonetheless, Judge Teitlebaum created his own allocation to ensure
that ALCOA would not receive a windfall as a result of the
modification, which was the lesser of (i) the ceiling price set forth in
the agreement, or (ii) the greater of the price calculated using the
original escalation clause or the price which provides ALCOA a
profit of one cent per pound.170
Although ALCOA’s proportionate loss allocation is supported by
the comments to section 2-615, which allow courts to “use equitable
principles in furtherance of commercial standards and good faith,”171
it is an unrealistic remedial framework. First, gathering the
necessary information is administratively difficult and costly.172 The
ALCOA trial, for example, lasted five weeks and comprised over
2000 pages of testimony.173 With the overloaded and underfunded
federal and state court system, 174 the time and costs of a
proportionate loss allocation are simply unworkable for the court
system.
Second, because it relies heavily on each case’s facts and
circumstances, a proportionate loss allocation would vary for each
case, creating uncertainty in contracting. 175 Certainty and finality
169

Id.
Id. at 79–80.
171
U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 6; Reeder, supra note 149, at 1095.
172
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 32, at 114; Sykes, supra note 51, at 50 (noting
that loss allocation is generally absent from remedies throughout the law due to
administrative costs).
173
Reeder, supra note 149, at 1096–97.
174
The Feeblest Branch, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 2011, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21530985; Paula Hannaford-Agor, Why Are
Trials Vanishing, Caseload Highlights: Examining the Work of State Courts
(2005), available at http://www.courtstatistics.org.
175
Printing Indus. Ass’n of N. Ohio v. Int’l Printing & Graphic Commc’ns Union,
Local No. 56, 584 F. Supp. 990, 998 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (“The willingness of courts
to reform contracts on the basis of subsequent knowledge may undermine the
policy of finality which is so essential and revered in contract law.”); Wabash, Inc.
v. Avnet, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 995, 999 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (“Under the logical
consequences…there would be no predictability or certainty for contracting
parties.”); Robert A. Hillman, Maybe Dick Speidel Was Right About Court
Adjustment, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 595, 599 (2009) [hereinafter Maybe Spiedel
Was Right]; Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the
Bargain Principle, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1123, 1127 (1986).
170
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are important objectives of contract law given the role that contracts
play in the global commercial environment. 176 Also, uncertainty
causes parties to spend more in transaction costs negotiating and
drafting the agreement in order to help minimize that uncertainty.177
Finally, inherent in a loss allocation approach is that a judge is
rewriting the contract for the parties whether or not they agree with
the revised terms.178 American law recognizes that competent adults
are free to contract with whom they choose, over which matters they
choose, and under which terms they choose, provided such contract
is not regarding an illegal subject matter. 179 This freedom of
contract is a fundamental principle in the United States.180 Only in
extreme circumstances should the law interfere with the freedom to
contract. 181 These circumstances include individuals who are
incompetent, individuals who did not voluntarily enter into the
contract, and individuals who were induced to enter into the contract
through fraudulent means.182 Accordingly, paternalistic doctrines of
unconscionability, incapacity, coercion, and fraud are appropriate

176

E.g., Williams Trading LLC v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5984(KBF),
2013 WL 1718916, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2013) (“The smooth functioning of
the United States economy depends on predictability in contract construction.
Contracting parties need to be able to have confidence that the bargain they strike
will be the bargain to which they shall be held.”); Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
506 N.E.2d 919, 923 (N.Y. 1987) (“[S]tability and predictability in contractual
affairs is a highly desirable jurisprudential value.”); see also In re Atkins, 139 B.R.
39, 40 (Bankr. M.D. Fl. 1992).
177
Halpern, supra note 16, at 1170; Sykes, supra note 51, at 72–73.
178
Dawson, supra note 117, at 18, 37–38.
179
Hurst, supra note 70, at 572 (“Contract is a consensual medium of doing
business.”); see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1905), overruled
in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
180
Balt. & Ohio Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900) (“[I]t must not be
forgotten that the right of private contract is no small part of the liberty of the
citizen, and that the usual and most important function of courts of justice is rather
to maintain and enforce contracts than to enable parties…to escape from their
obligation.”).
181
Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199, 205 (1927) (“[I]t is a matter of great public
concern that freedom of contract be not lightly interfered with.”)
182
Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356–57 (1931)
(“The general rule is that competent persons shall have the utmost liberty of
contracting and that their agreements voluntarily and fairly made shall be held
valid and enforced in the courts.”); Hurst, supra note 70, at 565.
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limitations of the freedom to contract. 183 But, when competent
adults voluntarily enter into an agreement, the law should not
interfere with its terms. 184 A court cannot and should not force
parties to accept terms or perform obligations created by a court and
not agreed upon by the parties, but that is precisely what loss
allocation entails.185
Even if proportional loss allocation were feasible, it only
addresses the remedial defects of commercial impracticability and
not any of the multitude of underlying issues with its rules and
application discussed throughout this article. The form and
substance of the commercial impracticability doctrine first needs to
be revised before the result of such a finding is addressed.
IV.

PRACTICABLE COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY

The following provision is one alternative way to restructure
commercial impracticability to remedy its defects through
straightforward language and the use of factors.
In the event that performance under a
contract becomes impracticable due to
excessive and unreasonable difficulty,
expense, injury, or loss, a court may excuse
such performance to the extent necessary to
prevent injustice.
183

See Harrison, supra note 151, at 593–94 (noting that rules “dealing with duress,
fraud, misrepresentation, and capacity” are intended “to protect the parties’
autonomy” and make them “less likely to enter into enforceable agreements that
do not hold the promise of a shared surplus.”)
184
Balt. & Ohio Sw. Ry. Co., 176 U.S. at 505–06 (“‘[M]en of full age and
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that
their contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred, and
shall be enforced by courts of justice. Therefore you have this paramount public
policy to consider – that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of
contract.’”) (quoting Sir George Jessel, an English judge influential in matters of
contract law); George Backer Mgmt. Corp. v. Acme Quilting Co., 385 N.E.2d
1062, 1066 (N.Y. 1978) (“Reformation is not granted for the purpose of alleviating
a hard or oppressive bargain, but rather to restate the intended terms of an
agreement.”).
185
Williams Trading LLC, 2013 WL 1718916, at *1; Dawson, supra note 117, at
18, 37–38.
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In making this determination, the
following factors are significant:
a) The extent to which the event is
outside of the control of the party
seeking excuse;
b) The extent to which the party seeking
excuse has made reasonable efforts to
minimize the difficulty, expense,
injury, or loss;
c) The extent to which the party seeking
excuse would make a net profit or loss
if performed as originally agreed upon
under the contract;
d) The
existence
of
insurance,
performance bond, guaranty, or other
mechanism that compensates either
party for all or part of the expense,
injury, or loss; and
e) Usage of trade, course of performance,
or course of dealing.
The provision begins by stating the basic rule for permitting
excuse under commercial impracticability: a court may excuse a
party in the interest of fairness if performance becomes excessively
and unreasonably difficult, expensive, or leads to excessive and
unreasonable loss or injury. 186 While the fundamental concept of
commercial impracticability remains unchanged, the provision uses
more straightforward language to create clarity and, therefore, lead
to consistent interpretation and application.
In particular, it eliminates the “basic assumption” requirement in
order to focus the analysis on the present rather than on the past
intent of the parties. 187 The provision also does not distinguish
186

See Mineral Park Land Co., 156 P. at 460 (“A thing is impossible in legal
contemplation when it is not practicable; [and a] thing is impracticable when it can
only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost.”); Aluminum Co. of Am., 499
F. Supp. At 70–73 (stating that impracticability focuses “distinctly on hardship”
and applies in “occurrences which greatly increase the costs, difficulty, or risk of
the party's performance”).
187
Rockland Indus., Inc., 991 F. Supp. at 471–72.
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between buyer and seller to ensure the availability of commercial
impracticability to any party meeting its requirements.188
Moreover, it provides a simple definition of commercial
impracticability that sets parameters to quiet arguments that courts
can discharge at will, yet broadens what constitutes commercial
impracticability beyond excessive financial burden.189 Even though
excessive expense is likely the most prevalent result of a
supervening event, other detrimental results are possible, such as
severe damage to business reputation, which could justify excuse
from a contract under commercial impracticability. 190 The definition
accepts this possibility by including “difficulty, injury, or loss.”
Most notably, the provision limits excuse under commercial
impracticability to circumstances in which it is necessary to prevent
injustice. While stability and reliability of a contract undoubtedly
are important considerations in commercial law, 191 fairness and
equity are also valuable considerations. 192 Although some judges
recognize that achieving fairness is an important objective, 193 the
current commercial impracticability provisions incorrectly assume
that these considerations are mutually exclusive. 194 The proposed
provision expressly incorporates injustice into the analysis but
balances these policy concerns by maintaining a narrower definition
of commercial impracticability.195
Although the provision begins fairly broad, it then sets forth
relevant factors that further guide judicial decisions to create a more
homogenous, predictable application. The use of factors certainly is
188

See supra notes 54–63 and accompanying text.
Hurst, supra note 70, at 555; supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text.
190
See York, supra note 21, at 266–68 (discussing the “paramount” importance of
business reputation in “current commercial practices”).
191
Neal-Cooper Grain Co., 508 F.2d at 294; Lloyd, 153 P.2d at 54; Classen, supra
note 19, at 405; Ostas & Darr, supra note 46, at 364; Wallach, supra note 19, at
218.
192
Halpern, supra note 16, at 1166–67, 1170; Ostas & Darr, supra note 46, at 358.
193
Gulf Oil Corp. v. F.P.C., 563 F.2d 588, 599 (3d Cir. 1977); Aluminum Co. of
Am., 499 F. Supp. at 76 (“Courts must decide the point at which the community’s
interest in predictable contract enforcement shall yield to the fact that enforcement
of a particular contract would be commercially senseless and unjust.”); E. Air
Lines, Inc., 415 F. Supp. at 438; Lloyd, 153 P.2d at 54; McGinnis, 312 S.E.2d at
772; see Helms Constr. & Dev. Co., 634 P.2d at 1225.
194
Ostas & Darr, supra note 46, at 345.
195
See id.
189
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not novel in contract law; both Article 2 and the Restatements utilize
factors in varying ways to provide some constraints to doctrines that
require both stability and flexibility.196
Each factor relates to either the extent to which excuse is
necessary to prevent injustice or the inability to prevent or avoid the
supervening event. These factors derive from commonalities among
judicial opinions. The weight of each factor should vary by case, but
by focusing the court on specific inquiries, commercial
impracticability can develop into a more uniformly applied doctrine,
which would lead to greater predictability.
The first factor courts would examine under this revision is the
extent to which the party seeking excuse could have prevented the
occurrence of the supervening event. This concept of “contributory
fault” is found implicitly in the Official Comments to section 2-615
and expressly in case law and speaks to the fairness of allowing
excuse.197 A party cannot cause or contribute to the cause of the
supervening event then expect excuse under commercial
impracticability. 198 To allow otherwise incentivizes the obligor to
create or contribute to a supervening event in order to avoid its
obligations.
The second factor evaluates the extent to which the party seeking
excuse attempted to mitigate the effects of the supervening event by
utilizing alternative means of performance, provided that the
contract does not prohibit those means.
Current case law
unanimously supports this factor, because an alternative means of
performance (or lack thereof) speaks to whether performance truly is
impracticable.199 If a reasonable alternative exists, then the obligor’s

196

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 139, 241–42, 360; U.C.C.
§ 2-206 (allowing for contract formation “by any medium reasonable in the
circumstances”).
197
U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 5 (“There is no excuse under this section, however, unless
the seller has employed all due measures to assure himself that his source will not
fail.”); Chajet, supra note 48, at 244–48; Hillman, supra note 131, at 619; e.g.,
Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 257 (N.D. Ill. 1974),
aff’d, 522 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1975) (“A party may not, by its own conduct, create
the event causing the impracticability of performance.”).
198
Chemetron Corp., 381 F. Supp. at 257.
199
E.g., Jennie-O Foods, Inc. v. United States, 580 F.2d 400, 409 (Fed. Cl. 1978);
N. Ill. Gas Co., 461 N.E.2d at 1061; Nora Springs Coop. Co., 247 N.W.2d at 748.
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performance is possible and not excusable under commercial
impracticability.200
The third and fourth factors focus on the financial impact of the
supervening event and the financial status of the obligor after that
event. Although the proposal expands circumstances of commercial
impracticability beyond financial impracticability, the reality is that
a majority of cases seek excuse due to the obligor’s excessive
financial burden caused by a supervening event. 201 Additionally,
contract law remedies typically focus on granting money damages to
either give the benefit of the bargain or to place the party in the same
position she was in prior to contract formation.202
Specifically, factor three requires courts to examine the
transaction affected by the supervening event as a whole. While the
event may itself create a financial burden, the party seeking excuse
may nonetheless make a net profit or only a small, manageable net
loss.
In these circumstances, excuse due to commercial
impracticability is neither necessary nor warranted. The fourth
factor focuses on the extent to which the party seeking excuse is
made whole or close to whole under an insurance policy, selfinsurance, or other loss-mitigating mechanism.
The last factor examines usage of trade, course of dealing, and
course of performance to determine whether excuse due to
commercial impracticability is appropriate. Usage of trade,203 course
of dealing,204 and course of performance205 are mainstays in contract
200

E.g., Am. Trading & Prod. Co., 343 F. Supp. at 95–96.
See supra notes 32–45 and accompanying text.
202
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344.
203
Under Article 2, “‘usage of trade’ is any practice or method of dealing having
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.”
U.C.C. § 1-303(c). The Restatements similarly define usage of trade as “a usage
having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to a particular agreement.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(1).
204
The U.C.C. defines a course of dealing as “a sequence of conduct concerning
previous transactions between the parties to a particular transaction that is fairly to
be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their
expressions and other conduct.” U.C.C. § 1-303(b). The Restatements define a
course of dealing almost identically as “a sequence of previous conduct between
the parties to an agreement which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a
201
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law, with numerous references in both Article 2 and the
Restatements.206 The drafters of Article 2 specifically intended this
emphasis on commercial custom and conduct in issues of contract
formation, contract interpretation, and contractual liability in order to
avoid rigid rules devoid of the parties’ actual intent.207 Arguably,
the drafters of Article 2 intended to excuse performance under
section 2-615 in accordance with commercial custom and practice.208
By evaluating usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of
performance in each commercial impracticability case, courts can
reach a decision that reflects the commercial practices and customs
in the parties’ industries.209 In doing so, courts can come nearer to a
decision that more closely reflects what the parties would have
agreed upon prior to the occurrence of the supervening event. 210
Indeed, some courts already look to usage of trade, course of dealing,

common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other
conduct.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223(1).
205
Only Article 2 contains a definition for course of performance, which is “a
sequence of conduct between the parties to a particular transaction.” U.C.C. § 1303(a).
206
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-202; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 202,
203,; see Hillman, supra note 131, at 623.
207
Aluminum Co. of Am., 499 F. Supp. at 76 (“The spirit of the Code is that such
decisions cannot justly derive from legal abstractions. They must derive from
courts sensitive to the mores, practices and habits of thought in the respectable
commercial world.”); U.C.C. § 1-303 cmt. 1; Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable
Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 710, 710–12 (1999); David V. Snyder, Language and Formalities in
Commercial Contracts: A Defense of Custom and Conduct, 54 SMU L. REV. 617,
620 (2001). The original drafters of the UCC, and in particular Karl Llewellyn,
were legal realists who sought to replace the formalistic common law with a
“functional reality.” N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing the Origins of Realistic
Jurisprudence: A Prequel to the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange Over Legal Realism,
1989 DUKE L.J. 1302, 1303 (1989). To read more about the effect of the legal
realists on the UCC, see WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d. ed. 2012); Allen R. Kamp, Between-theWars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the Uniform
Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325 (1995); Gregory E. Maggs,
Karl Llewellyn’s Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541 (2000).
208
York, supra note 21, at 245–46.
209
Snyder, supra note 191, at 617–18.
210
York, supra note 21, at 245–46.
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and course of performance under the current commercial
impracticability for these very reasons.211
V.

CONCLUSION

The current construct of commercial impracticability is
unnecessarily complex and focuses on irrelevant and inappropriate
inquiries such as foreseeability of the event and whether
“performance . . . has been made impracticable by the occurrence of
a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption.”212 Given the number of articles critiquing commercial
impracticability or offering alternative schemes, 213 the doctrine
clearly requires a comprehensive, straightforward revision that aligns
with the reality of doing business in the modern, complex economy.
The objective of this article was to propose alternative language
that
simplifies,
clarifies,
and
modernizes
commercial
impracticability to achieve the UCC’s stated purpose and to create
consistency and, thus, predictability. The intent is not to broaden the
availability of commercial impracticability, but to clarify when it is
available and to whom through straightforward language and
relevant inquiries.
The proposal maintains the fundamental
principles intended by the drafters but not achieved through poor
language choices and illogical and inconsistent judicial decisions.
The mission, should the drafters of Article 2 and the
Restatements choose to accept it, is to revise commercial
impracticability utilizing clearer language and appropriate inquiries
so that commercial impracticability can meet its mission to provide a
fair excuse mechanism that reflects business practices in a consistent
and predictable manner.
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See, e.g., Asphalt Int’l, Inc., 667 F.2d at 265; Aluminum Co. of Am., 499 F.
Supp. at 67.
212
U.C.C. § 2-615; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261.
213
E.g., Classen, supra note 19; Dawson, supra note 117; Duesenberg, supra note
40; Elofson, supra note 68; Halpern, supra note 16, at 1132–34; Ostas & Darr,
supra note 46; Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 32; Wallach, supra note 19; Walt,
supra note 46; Walter, supra note 8; Wladis, supra note 18; York, supra note 21.
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